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Abstract. Smaller, smarter and faster edge devices in the Internet of
things era demands secure data analysis and transmission under re-
source constraints of hardware architecture. Lightweight cryptogra-
phy on edge hardware is an emerging topic that is essential to en-
sure data security in near-sensor computing systems such as mobiles,
drones, smart cameras and wearables. In this article, the current state of
memristive cryptography is placed in context of lightweight hardware
cryptography. The paper provides a brief overview of the traditional
hardware lightweight cryptography and cryptanalysis approaches. The
contrast for memristive cryptography with respect to traditional ap-
proaches is evident through this article, and need to develop a more
concrete approach to developing memristive cryptanalysis to test mem-
ristive cryptographic approaches is highlighted.
1 Introduction
The penetration of internet into every aspect of our lives also brings with it several
challenges related to data security and privacy [112,28]. Manipulation and misuse
of data can have a substantial influence in the way we perceive and view our world
[18,104]. The cryptography [48] studies deals with encryption and decryption, while
cryptanalysis [90] deals with the techniques to break encrypted systems. The existing
cryptography methods [9] are largely based on mathematical theories designed for
computational hardness, with an aim to make it difficult for an adversary to break
into such systems.
The vulnerability of the encryption techniques are often exposed through various
side channel attacks [114,16,44] and through high performance computing tools. It is
expected that with future technologies such as quantum computing [87] can introduce
massive parallelism that can make most of the encryption techniques look very weak.
Given the challenges are significant in the years ahead, it is only important to address
this topic in a hardware perspective in view of the challenges ahead with post-quantum
cryptography era [17]. The exclusive need to ensure secure data processing in edge
devices with internet requires high speed and low power offered by hardware circuits
that is not beatable by the existing software only counterparts [26].
The hardware based cryptography [84,27] has been in use for several decades, as
it offers a faster and efficient way to generate keys and random numbers. In addition,
embedded in reconfigurable chips, or that in ASIC, it is practically difficult to decode
the logic or implement various side channel attacks [30]. The dynamic nature of such
a e-mail: apj@ieee.org
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keys makes it extremely hard to break. With advancement of wearable and internet of
things devices, it becomes even more important to provide on-chip solutions, that are
area and power efficient [82]. The ability to have low power solutions are important
as many of these wearable works on limited battery capacity, and often require secure
data transmission [80]. The implementation of the existing algorithmic only solutions
are not efficient in such situations, and nano-electronic solutions become more viable
.
In the last decade, there has been a substantial push towards more than Moore’s
era technologies [39,106], with focus on emerging devices for non-traditional comput-
ing architectures and systems. This is required to overcome the limitations imposed
by device scaling [45] and the rapid need to have higher computational capabilities for
edge devices [55]. In this review, we present the overall developments in the hardware
based cryptography with specific focus on the use of memristor devices and networks.
The importance of this topic lay in the intersection of memristor as an effective de-
vice used for chaotic system, having ability to switch states, and having interesting
properties that resemble the generalisation functions of a neuron and its networks.
The paper is organised into five sections: section 2 provides an introduction to
memristors and memristor networks, section 3 provides background on lightweight
cryptography, section 4 builds on the previous section to introduce memristor cryp-
tography and section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Memristor networks
The memristor (Fig. 1(a,b)) remained as an elusive circuit element for several decades,
until the claims of this missing circuit element being found was proposed in 2008 [93].
After this, there have been a surge of memory devices that is deemed fit into the broad
category of memristors. They find applications in as non-volatile memory, modelling
neural networks, chaotic circuits, signal processing, and cryptography. In several of
these applications, the most popular memristor circuit configurations is that of a
memristor crossbar configuration (Fig. 1(c)), which can be used for memory array,
and for dot-product computations.
2.1 Memristor in a nutshell
The memristor is considered as a fourth fundamental circuit element [93,22]. There
has been arguments in the recent past for and against this assertion [100,2]. Nonethe-
less, there are several useful behavioural properties that makes memristor practically
a very useful circuit element [43,37,23]. In a recent paper, five enigmas of non-volatile
memristor device theory [21] were proposed and proved:
1. Enigma 1: All non-volatile memristors have continuum memories.
2. Enigma 2: Conductance of all non-volatile memristors can be tuned by applying
single voltage pulses.
3. Enigma 3: Faster switching can always be achieved by increasing the pulse ampli-
tude.
4. Enigma 4: Periodic unipolar input gives non-periodic finger-like multi-prong-pinched
hysteresis loops.
5. Enigma 5: DC VI curves of non-volatile memristors are fakes.
These enigmas provide the summary of what we know today about idealistic mem-
ristor device. In fact, modelling of any realistic memristor with high accuracy is very
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Fig. 1. (a) shows an example memristor symbol and its equivalent representation, (b) shows
the IV characteristics and (c) shows the memristor array in crossbar.
challenging task. The underlying reason for this is largely due to the material charac-
teristics of the devices that vary significantly from one device to another. The device
level variability issues for large majority of memristor devices is still not resolved to
completely validate with mathematical models with accuracy’s similar to standard
CMOS technology. Any simulation of memristors without variability analysis is in-
complete and does not reflect a realistic implementation. In contrast, the variability
of memristor specific to a manufacturing process is often useful for cryptographic
application such as to generate random keys and physically unclonable functions.
2.2 Crossbar arrays
The crossbar latch [57] is one of the memristor array configuration that was shown to
be useful for implementing various digital logic operations. The memristor crossbar
array architecture can also be used for writing and reading conductance values of the
memristor making it useful as a memory array. The crossbar architecture can also be
used for building analog neural computing units.
In a crossbar arrangement of memristors [73,74,101], the inputs are applied to the
rows as voltage signals and outputs are read as current signals. The current output
is a weighted sum of input voltage, where the weights corresponds to the memristor
conductance[50]. Mathematically, this is equivalent to a dot product operator which
is required for weighted summation of inputs in each neural network layer [111,56].
The two-terminal memristor devices are area efficient, and can help accelerate neural
network computations at high speed and low power. The memristor crossbar can also
be used as a regular memory array, with each memristor in the network is capable to
be programmed to several discrete resistive states [3,63].
The variability of the memristor states from device to device under the same
conditions and constraints, often is considered as a challenge for having stable analog
memory [40,91]. This makes the use of memristor as an analog memory in large
crossbar array not practical, however, as a discrete state device and as a binary state
device, they can be used effectively, in small arrays. The crossbar also suffers from
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sneak path problems, parasitic resistors, and wire resistors, that can further limit the
large scaling of crossbar that can be implemented today [61,54].
3 Lightweight cryptography
3.1 Cryptograpic methods
Lightweight cryptography [29] works between the trade-offs of security, cost, and
performance, and is focused at devices and systems on edge. The increase in in-
ternet connected devices, requires to build smarter systems that are secure using
low-cost hardware solutions. The symmetric and asymmetric ciphers are essentially
a major topic of study in hardware cryptography, each having a different set of ap-
plications. Hardware for asymmetric ciphers are more complex than symmetric ones,
and consume more area on chip and power. For example, in terms of computational
complexity, symmetric cipher such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [25]
algorithm is about 1000 much faster than an optimised elliptic-curve cryptography
[36] that is an asymmetric algorithm.
There exists several hardware implementations of ciphers such as Hight[38], Clefia[89],
DESXL [81], DESL, SEA[72], Hummingbird[31], PRESENT[83], PRINTcipher[51],
mCrypton[62], KLEIN[35], TWINE[97], SIMON [10], SPECK[10], PRINCE[14], PRIDE[4],
LBLOCK[108], MIBS[41], Puffin [20], ESF[98], Piccolo[88], Khudra[53] etc in use to-
day, making this an emerging topic of study for edge devices. In addition, there are
also several requirements for AEAD[92] and hash functions[8], for lightweight cryp-
tography, such as, they should be useful for short messages, optimised for resource
constraint hardware, efficient key preprocessing, apply to different platforms, and
have low power/energy/latency. The resource constraints also means that there are
higher ’risk’ in design, lower security margins, and few number of components that
can be targets of attacks.
3.2 Cryptanalysis methods
The analysis of the cryptography algorithms in general is known as cryptanalysis[86],
and is an essential aspect of testing the reliability of the cryptography system for
practical use. The major classes of attacks[95] can be classified as based on impossible
differentials, guess and determine, and that are dedicated for a given method. In
classical differential attack[46], the difference two outputs relative to the difference in
pain text is tracked. In a truncated differential attacks[52], changes to only part of
the differences are predicted. The impossible differential attacks[49] on the other hand
uses a differential with probability 0. The Miss-in-the-middle [12] improves over this,
and by extending such approaches to forward and backward can give information of
key bits[103].
There have been numerous improvements to impossible differential attacks such as
multiple impossible differentials, choosing the correctly the changes, state-test tech-
niques, and improving the estimate of pairs [15]. The example applications of im-
possible differential attacks includes a best attack on CLEFIA with 13 rounds[68],
improved best attacks for Camellia[107], AES attacks comparable with best mitm
ones in 7 rounds [67] and LBlock with reduced rounds [47].
The Meet-in-the-middle[79] attack is relatively an old approach, that over the
years have been improved using partial matching[105], bicliques[13], sieve- in-the-
middle[19] etc. This approach requires fewer data and is an applied tool. The bicliques
method can be used to reduce the total number of computations, with the main
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focus of acceleration of exhaustive search. Bicliques[42] have been used for attacks on
PRESENT, LED, KLEIN, HIGHT, Piccolo, TWINE, and LBlock.
Merging the lists and dissection algorithm such as that for divide-and-conquer
and rebound attacks find applications in ARMADILLO2[1], ECHO256[76], JH42[77],
Grstl[70], Klein, AES-like, Sprout[59], and Ketje. Among the popular algorithm spe-
cific attack schemes, such as for PRESENT, the most effective approach as been
multiple linear attacks using Sieving, forward and backward computations [60].
4 Memristor cryptography
The majority of the cryptography works based on memristor circuits aim for low power
and compact on-chip solution. Given that more and more devices are connected to
internet, such solutions are ideally suitable for edge devices and can be considered
within the class of lightweight cryptography solutions.
4.1 Chaotic systems
The memristor due to this resistive switching behaviour forms as an excellent choice
for building chaotic circuits[75,113]. The cryptographic application[109] of chaotic
circuits range from that of random number generators to that for modelling dynamic
systems. The state equations for chaotic systems can be parameterised using the
memristor device, and offers an area efficient way to implement chaotic oscillators
and circuits. The chaotic systems can be used to build chaotic encryptor and the
chaotic decryptor for secure communication [5]. The memristor based chaotic system
also finds application in image encryption [102].
The use of random numbers are essential to ensure the difficulty of breaking a
majority of cryptographic systems used today such as AES and RSA[71]. The ability
to guess the pseudo random numbers generated by conventional techniques within
this algorithm can be a potential weakness that can be exploited by the attackers. A
chaotic random number generators[24] can overcome this issue by making it extremely
difficult to predict the generated numbers.
4.2 Physical unclonable functions
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [64] from electronic circuits has a unique mi-
crostructure that results from the variability introduced during semiconductor manu-
facturing. The physical variability are unpredictable making it impossible to replicate
its structure. PUFs are implemented using challengeresponse authentication, where
it evaluates the underlying microstructure. For a given stimulus (or challenge), the
microstructure responds (or response) in unpredictable but in a precise manner. The
challenge-response pair (CRP) does not reveal the device structure and hence is re-
sistant to spoofing attacks.
The cryptographic keys can be also obtained using key extractor PUFs. The PUF
hardware costs lower that a ROM based CRP that uses table of responses to the chal-
lenges. Even with same manufacturing process, the PUF from one device to another
will be different, making it unclonable and difficult to compute unknown response.
Without knowing all the physical properties its practically not possible to predict
CRPs. This essentially means that PUFs are useful as unique signatures for edge
devices, and is also useful for key generation and a source of randomness.
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The classical approaches to cryptography are often slow, energy consuming, and
prone to various attacks. The physical unclonable functions [94] are hardware tokens
that depends on the intrinsic behavior of memristor networks, and maps a challenge
to a response. The public physical unclonable functions (PPUF) [11,65] is one of
the prominent build using memristor crossbar arrays[85,33,69,6,99], and employs
the non-idealities and characteristics of the memristor devices. Such PPUF can be
used for multiple party security using keys, authentications, time stamping, and bit
commitments.
Arguably, the most important aspect that makes memristor a suitable device for
PUF is the ability to have randomness within a memristor network, making it a good
building block for a complex physical system for extracting secret keys. In the past,
the use of Ring Oscillator PUF (ROPUF)[66], Arbiter PUF (APUF)[96], and SRAM
(Static Random Access Memory) PUF (SRAM PUF)[34] used digital designs testing
on FPGAs or ASICs. However, with scaling, these systems become unstable due to
dependence of temperature and practical signal integrity issues. The use of nanoelec-
tronic systems such as based on memristor could become popular for generating large
challenge-response pairs, as they prove to be area efficient and provides an option
for generating more stable PUF such as within crossbar networks[110,78]. The PUF
design with memristors can be also extended to develop reconfigurable PUFs using
different memristor network configurations, which help generalise the PUF approach
to larger number of key exchange schemes[32].
4.3 Hash functions
The memristor crossbar can be used to build encrypted messaging systems, such as
MemHash[58,7]. In MemHash, a prefix and suffix is wrapped with original message.
This message is further passed through a scrambler that is linear function of input
bits, cycle count and a random value read from the crossbar array. This is used to
generate an address and a value to write to the crossbar array. For the subsequent
cycles, a differential read circuit is used to provide the input to the scrambler and for
having a signature read-back.
The feasibility of using such hash functions in realistic systems requires further
tests, as the quality of the crossbar devices can have an impact on how it is used in
the hashing based algorithms. The interface circuits such as differential read block
if inaccurate can have a significant impact on the performance of hash functions
generated using the memhash systems. Nonetheless, this approach is useful as the
technology matured and process related issues resolved.
4.4 Open challenges
Reliability issues There exists several open challenges in this area of work. The field
of memristor cryptography is challenged by the reliability issues of memristor devices.
The device and process variability in memristor crossbars is a useful aspect of the
design of most memristor cryptographic systems. However, there are several practical
reliability issues that are not usually accounted for in the design such as effect of
aging, state variability, signal integrity and, electromagnetics issues.
Variability The integration of the CMOS circuits with that of the memristor arrays
in a cryptography chip is not a trivial task. Since the variability between a non-
ideal memristor crossbar from one chip to another can be high, the process related
variability that acts as an encoding signature expected from these devices would be
hard to replicate under the effect of aging and temperature changes.
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Architecture robustness The system integration and architecture for memristor cryp-
tography is another open problem. While there are few class of architectures such as
based on PUF and hash functions, they could be prone to side channel attacks when
the designs are of small scale. Further, communication errors on-chip and off-chip can
be explored by adversaries to model the behaviour of the encryption scheme.
Hardware acceleration The speed-up of traditional hardware implementations of
cryptography algorithms is an on-going challenge for edge devices. There are dedicated
cryptography chips that are incorporated as a co-processor in modern commercial
edge devices. These co-processors uses digital gates and random number generators,
which could be in future efficiently implemented with memristor threshold logic gates
and chaotic generators.
Neural cryptography Neural cryptography is an emerging field of study that is yet to
be proven to be a useful cryptography solution. In this approach, the human is kept
out of the loop, while the encryption, decryption and adversaries are all neural network
machines. Given that several different types of neural networks can be implemented
with memristor crossbar arrays, it is possible to built and deploy the memristive
neural cryptography solutions in the upcoming years.
5 Discussions and concluding remarks
The hardware security primitives are required to provide on-chip solutions that work
at high speeds and provide additional layer of security as it is difficult to physically
identify the on-chip circuits, and reduces the chance of the attacker to crack such sys-
tems. However, as a caution of note, the cryptanlysis for the memristor cryptographic
systems is not a developed field. The understanding for dedicated attacks needs to
be further investigated. The design risk, low security margin, and fewer number of
components in the memristor systems offers certain room for attacks. These systems
are not yet fully tested for practical use.
The use of memristor circuits in traditional lightweight cyptographic methods
for edge devices is an important and open problem. Since memristor networks can
serve as associative memories they could be incorporated into different algorithmic
cryptographic methods. The memristor circuits are also a good source for random key
generation, that can make it useful for various traditional cryptographic methods.
The memristor behaviours are hard to replicate under realistic conditions. This
makes it a good candidate for the PUFs. On the other hand, the impact of reliability,
number of write-erase cycles, stability and the interconnect issues are not very well
studied for practical use to build memristive cryptographic chips. The cryptanalysis
over such hardware issues are nearly not studied at this stage in a practical context,
and a substantial progress is required for memristive chips to be of realistic use in
modern cryptography.
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